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June 22, 2008

On the Two-State Solution

By: Bernard Chazelle

I explain below why the prospects for a two-state solution settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are so dim.

(If your time on this site is limited and you haven't read about my trip, I urge you to skip this essay and, instead, read my report. Essays can wait. Human stories can't. Thanks.)



WHY ISRAEL WON'T ACCEPT A TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Bernard Chazelle

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often narrated as a morality play, where offers are generous, lessons are taught, consciousness is seared, terrorism is rewarded, etc. Let's quit the blame game and focus, instead, on what's feasible and what's not. For starters, one can safely notch the right-wing fantasy of a Jordanian absorption of Palestine in the "Dream on, settlers" column. Ethnic cleansing is passé.

What about a one-state solution? Within 10 years, Jews will be a clear minority in the population west of the Jordan, so a democratic unitary state (eg, modeled on South Africa) would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state, an outcome not everyone would greet with cartwheels. Though rarely discussed, a federal alternative could be envisaged. Besides the sticky issue of land division, however, the physical laws of politics work against it. Absent a modicum of trust and a desire to share a common fate, centrifugal forces might prove too powerful to forestall an eventual breakup. If Belgium, a model of harmony by Mideast standards, can barely pull it off, what chance does a (con)federal "Isratine" have? Don't expect a democratic binational state any time soon.

The two-state solution has its appeal. It would satisfy a majority of Palestinians and confer upon Israel the statehood legitimacy that it craves. It would bring the Jewish state peace with the Arab world along the lines of the 2002 Saudi Initiative, as well as a recognized right of self-defense against Palestinian cross-border attacks. Unfortunately, 40 years of history have gamed the system against the two-state solution. Once the only realistic road to peace, it is now a challenge likely beyond Israel's ability. This leaves the region with two options: Apartheid or war. Barring a miracle, it will get both. So let's talk about the miracle.


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With its popularity fading rapidly, the main asset of the two-state solution is its consensual delineation: Taba '01 or any '67-border variant that ensures the viability of a Palestinian state. Opponents cite the failure of the 2005 Gaza evacuation to bring peace to the Strip as Exhibit A. They conveniently forget that the occupation continued and the total number of settlers was actually higher after the withdrawal than before. They ask, How do we keep a two-state solution from turning into a Qassam launch-pad expansion program? Such concerns must and can be addressed. But the stumbling block lies elsewhere—specifically, in a game-theoretic deadlock.

To understand this, it is best to begin with a paradox. Everybody knows that to "rewind to '67" would be a risky move for any Israeli leader and that the risk increases with every settlement expansion. Why then has the number of settlers doubled since Oslo? The never-say-die E1 project threatens to cut off East Jerusalem from the West Bank and divide a future Palestinian state into 3 (and arguably 4) noncontiguous parts. As I drove recently by the giant settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, I wondered how a Palestinian capital could ever be wrested from that urban octopus of Israeli control now girding East Jerusalem. Condoleezza Rice's latest bit of cheerleading was promptly acknowledged by an Israeli Cabinet decision to build hundreds of housing units in Givat Ze'ev. The number of checkpoints and obstacles was supposed to go down after Annapolis: it went up by 51. Can Israel be serious about a two-state solution?

When someone embarks on a diet and then proceeds to double his food intake, it is reasonable to wonder if he doesn't secretly enjoy the extra weight. Reasonable, yes; but, in this case, wrong. The crux of the paradox is not that Israel enjoys the status quo but that it has no incentive to play a land-for-peace game incrementally. Three reasons for this: Israeli aims are intangible (eg, promise of peace) but Palestinian objectives are concrete (eg, land handover); settler withdrawal is irreversible, whereas a lull in violence can be broken at any time; finally, the two-state solution is an asynchronous trade, ie, an exchange of a present good (land) for a future one (peace). Instead of addressing these deal breakers head-on, the Road Map tossed in a goodie bag full of sops (eg, governance reform, trade offices, demonstration of good faith), which only gave Israel political cover for sitting on its hands. Incrementalism runs against Palestinian interests as well because what they have to offer, peace, is not splittable into tradable chunks.

Besides ruling out a phased process, a highly asymmetric deal of the land-for-peace type requires either trust between the parties (nonexistent) or a mutually trusted arbiter with coercive power. Israel trusts only the US and coercion is not an option. Why not? Israeli journalist Akiva Eldar tells this joke: "Mr Prime Minister, would you like Israel to become our 51st state?" "Thanks but no thanks, Mr President." "Why not?" "Because, as a US state, we would have only two senators." The tragedy of US-Israeli relations is that AIPAC has deprived Israeli leaders of one of the most potent arrows in their political quiver: the "option" of letting Israel be (or appear to be) coerced by the US. Whether the US would ever acquiesce is another matter.

Some context: The US has always opposed national liberation movements that got in the way of its hegemonic aims, so why would it suddenly make an exception for the Palestinians? It is convenient to exonerate US policymakers by pointing the finger at the Israel lobby, but the root of the problem goes beyond AIPAC. Mearsheimer and Walt correctly answered the wrong question: Congress, indeed, takes its marching orders from AIPAC and US-Israeli relations are bad for both countries (though excellent for their establishments). No doubt the Israel lobby has stood in the way of a fair settlement. But to lay the blame squarely on it, one would need to make the case that US policy would be notably different in its absence. The evidence is unpersuasive. Israel has been the linchpin of Pax Americana in the Middle East since June 1967: Cold War then; Carter Doctrine now. The lobby may rejoice in this but can hardly take credit for it. In fact, if it ever deviated from US hegemonic goals (which might eventually happen over Iran), it would quickly discover the limits of its power.

It is undeniable, however, that efforts to stifle public criticism of Israel have created a climate of intimidation. Not everyone enjoys being called an anti-Semite or a self-hating Jew for accurately describing the West Bank as an Apartheid society. Media gatekeepers and college administrators have been kept in line. The cranks at Campus Watch are shameless thugs, but what do we call the self-censoring academics and cowed public intellectuals who toss overboard any shred of moral courage to speed their ascension to power? Why must the New York Times feature opinions about Israel that cover only a fraction of the range on offer in Haaretz?

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Intangibility, irreversibility, asynchronicity, plus the lack of mutual trust or of a trusted enforcer: these are the strategic reasons all incremental approaches to the two-state solution have failed so far (eg, Oslo I/II, Wye River, Road Map). As if this were not enough, two more disincentives have kept Israel from playing along. One of them is the paradox that, by curbing terrorism, the separation barrier has diminished the short-term added value of peace, a commodity whose market price tends to vary in proportion to its distance to the buyer's present sense of security. (Growing missile threats may soon mess up this calculus.) The other disincentive is Israel's lack of bargaining power. How so? To be effective, a peace agreement would require overwhelming support among Palestinians (whereas majority support in Israel would be sufficient). This niggling detail all but decimates Israel's bargaining power, as it presents it with a "binary" negotiating stand, where wresting the slightest concession quickly becomes counterproductive. Think of it as negotiating the purchase of a parachute: settling for half a parachute at half the price might be an option for the seller but not the buyer. For Israel, it's all or nothing.

What's wrong with "nothing"? Nothing, of course, is the current policy. It is also Zionism's death march. So you'd think Israel would have ditched the "Road Map to Nowhere" long ago and hurried to cut a two-state deal. Ah, if only it could, but you've heard it before: Hamas must recognize Israel; Abbas is a weakling; the terrorist infrastructure must be dismantled; etc. Hogwash. Israel drags its feet because it finds the peace pill unbearably bitter. How bitter? At the very least: dismantling 120 settlements; relocating 110,000 settlers; swapping pre-67 land for settlement blocs already in Israeli hands; rerouting the separation barrier; ceding control over 40% of the West Bank; sharing Jerusalem as a capital; letting in 10-50K refugees; giving away vital water rights; returning the Golan to Syria (no comprehensive peace without it); engaging Hamas; facing violent domestic opposition; endangering the careers and lives of Israeli leaders; last but not least, implicitly admitting that two-thirds of Israel's history has been a monumental blunder.

Whether these costs are just deserts or unfairness incarnate is not a subject I wish to address here—just as I will not discuss whether ceding a mere 22% of historic Palestine (a lousy deal by '47 standards) is an equitable compromise. These are the cards on the table today. To borrow a bon mot from his former chief of staff, Sharon pickled the peace process in "formaldehyde." In truth, Oslo was an incremental process doomed from the start, regardless of Rabin's fate. (Only Arafat could manage to make his people swallow such a stinker.) The parties could have changed tack along the way, but they didn't. No doubt the Palestinians did their part to undermine the peace process: wicked attacks against innocent civilians; failure of the PLO, like Algeria's FLN before it, to grow from a revolutionary movement into a governing institution; etc. Yet, like France in Algeria, Israel bears the ultimate responsibility for the conflict: occupiers always do.

That said, critics of Israel tend to underestimate the barriers to peace. This is not an excuse but a statement of fact: the two-state solution demands of Israel the kind of concessions history wrests from nations defeated at war. Having been defeated at peace, not at war, Israel is psychologically unequipped for the task. All the giving must be, de facto, Israeli and the taking Palestinian—the neat thing about having nothing is that you have nothing to give. Of course, Israel would be "giving" nothing—only returning what it grabbed in contravention of international law—but it is indicative of its delusions of innocence that it should always speak of generous offers, never of legal redress. Peace requires quick, painful surgery. The Road Map? Think of it as handing the patient a Swiss Army knife and asking her to cut off her own leg. Is it any wonder Israel has opted to live with the gangrene and cement the current Apartheid regime in the territories?

If Israel's 60th anniversary proves anything, it is that the Palestinian problem won't go away on its own. Sounding like a pyromaniac warning of the dangers of fire, Olmert put it bluntly: "If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses [...] the State of Israel is finished." Squelched in 1948, the two-state idea began to gain mutual acceptance barely two decades ago; it took 15 years for Arafat to sell it to the PLO. It was not even part of Oslo and it has never captured the Palestinian imagination. Today, it elicits among Israelis not a sigh of hope but a collective yawn. The two-state solution may be that rare idea that goes directly from "futuristic" to "obsolete" without stopping at the intermediate stage called "timely."

Geopolitics is changing, too. Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, the region's ascending power, now loom larger in the Israeli psyche than the Palestinian conflict. Israel has never lost a war against the Palestinians but it got bloodied twice in Lebanon. Peace with Syria has a low cost/benefit ratio for Israel and it appears to be back on the agenda. A deal would frustrate Washington because it wouldn't break the Tehran-Damascus axis, just as Jordan's normalization with Israel didn't hurt a bit its relations with Saddam or Hamas—who can forget King Hussein's ordering Bibi to provide Meshaal an antidote after Mossad botched his assassination? America's waning influence in the region may prove a blessing. It may force Israel to ditch its endless excuses and realize it is powerful enough to take the risks of peace: deal with Syria; engage with Hamas; and, crucially, end the occupation. One can dream. The evidence is somewhat less oneiric: unless Palestine accepts to become a client state of the US, Israel will never be leaned upon to set it free; and it won't do it of its own volition.

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Approaching the two-state solution as an incremental exchange of piecemeal concessions is doomed. Outside coercion is ruled out, so a successful implementation would require of Israel to assume voluntarily the submissive posture of a vanquished nation: an unlikely scenario for a country unaccustomed to defeat and the behavioral exigencies that go with it. (Losing wars is bad, but that's how nations grow up.) The two-state solution calls for visionary leadership that Israel does not have, international prodding that is nonexistent, and an obliging enemy that has never much been the obliging kind. The final nail in the coffin might be its dwindling popular support.

Ominously for Israel, the military deterrent of a small country stuck in the heart of the Muslim world will not last. The clock is ticking. If Israel ceases to be a Jewish-majority state, what will Israeli parents say when their secular children ask them what's so cool about being a minority in a small country next to Syria when one could be a minority in a big country next to Canada? Israel must travel the painful road to Taba: all the way, all alone, and all at once. The odds are stacked against it. But then the odds of Moses parting the sea were never that good either.


— Bernard Chazelle

Posted at June 22, 2008 11:11 AM
Comments

It's a bad idea, anyway -- it's good that it won't happen. Palestine will never, ever be secure with murderous assholes on its border. Frankly, the only likely outcome is also the most ironic: arabs will make up a majority in Israel (which makes sense), outbreeding the -- well, can't call them natives, can you -- and end up in the legislature. The MOMENT the Palestenians choose protest and votes over bullets, Israel hawks lose. That's why they work so hard to murder Palestenians who are using peaceful political methods: the militants are actually a boon to them in many ways.

In the U.S., whites dealt with this problem with Jim Crow and poll taxes -- and we still have the latter, thanks to a traitorous Supreme Court. It will be interesting to see what the Israeli hawks do once Palestine's strategy shifts. Interesting in a "they massacred HOW many people?" sorta way.

Posted by: No One of Consequence at June 22, 2008 01:12 PM

Don't expect a democratic bi-national state any time soon.

for that to happen, wouldn't it require that it cease to be a "Jewish" state?

is that REALLY ever gonna be an option?

Posted by: woody, tokin librul at June 22, 2008 01:55 PM

"The other disincentive is Israel's lack of bargaining power. How so? To be effective, a peace agreement would require overwhelming support among Palestinians (whereas majority support in Israel would be sufficient). This niggling detail all but decimates Israel's bargaining power, as it presents it with a "binary" negotiating stand, where wresting the slightest concession quickly becomes counterproductive.
[...]
What's wrong with "nothing"? Nothing, of course, is the current policy. It is also Zionism's death march."

Hello Bernard,

This is an exceptional essay, but one point: I think you may be wrong about the Palistinians not willing to support a 2-state solution within the '67 borders-- the problem is they would do so only with every single Jewish settlement removed, not just the token few that Washington and Tel Aviv want.( Or rather, the token few they say they want removed, because Washington and Tel Aviv are not serious about peace-- they just recognize they need to put on a show...)

And I'd argue that Sharon demonstrated that 100 per cent settler removal is possible when he removed the Gaza settlers, making this more of a sticking point.

Posted by: Jonathan Versen at June 22, 2008 04:45 PM

WE are paying these people to kill each other and have been for a long, long time. I am assuming doing "nothing" means "nothing toward peace". WE gave one man a jet and a Hellfire missile which made the other man an easy target. That's yer foreign policy. Making those unholy alliances in the Holy Land IS what got YOU here.

Posted by: Mike Meyer at June 22, 2008 07:12 PM

Jonathan V. I am sorry if I implied somewhere that the Palestinians would not support a 2-state solution if it were a clean deal. (If you can tell me where I give that impression, I'll try to rewrite that passage.) Because I completely agree with you.

What I was trying to say (maybe badly) is that Palestinians have never been enthusiastic about it. But although they have red lines (like J'lem) they could cut a deal.

About Gaza, though, I don't think that proves much of anything. It's true that if Olmert said that by next monday all IDF troops will quit the WB, all the settlers would leave on the spot. So in that sense you are right. But no prime minister would stay in power a minute if he/she said that.

The Gaza evacuation was also easy to digest because at the end of 2005 the settlement population had in fact increased by 1,000 (despite the 9,000 loss from Gaza).

Posted by: Bernard Chazelle at June 22, 2008 07:12 PM

Woody, I think it's inevitable, personally. You can't have a nonsecular democracy -- one of those adjetives will eventually give out.

Posted by: No One of Consequence at June 22, 2008 07:12 PM

Bernard, I am referring to what you say about Israel's supposed lack of bargaining power-- what they lack is incentive, because they know the US will support them in their gaming the peace process to take more and more land while perpetually negotiating in bad faith. But you make it sound like the Israeli government "can't" make a deal, when you say they lack bargaining power, when it is much closer to the truth to say they just don't want to make a deal.

I tell this anecdote often: A friend who casually follows politics once asked me if I thought there would ever be peace in the middle east, after earlier noting that this was an "ancient" conflict.

I told him that I felt the main obstacle to peace was the US, and when America spends and borrows herself to irrelevance we will no longer be able to wield any real clout in the region, Israel will realize she has to cut a deal with the Palistinians-- and will.

Anyway:If this next century will be dominated by the EU and China, which seems likely, it is highly unlikely either would be stupid enough to take on America's role as Israel's protector, and would more likely try to position themselves as the friends of the emerging nations, whether just as a facade or in more meaningful terms. This would be in contrast with "nasty ole America" and "nasty ole Israel", and will be seen as good P.R.

And the image, if it works, will have currency because of the decades of bad will the US has earned in the region and elsewhere by virtue of our sundry interventions and related policies.

Posted by: Jonathan Versen at June 22, 2008 11:25 PM

Jonathan: I am saying that Israel has to give it all away. It's accepted that between 2 to 5 percent of the WB will be swapped for Israeli land. Any attempt by Israel to say bargain for 10% would backfire. In others words, there's virtually nothing left to negotiate. We're past the bargaining phase.

You make an interesting observation about the US.

Everything that's been happening in the last few months has shown the increasing irrelevance of the US: the "tahdi'eh" with Hamas, the Turkish-mediated Israeli-Syrian track, the Doha meeting about Lebanon, etc. No US presence.
Mind-bloggling.

Posted by: Bernard Chazelle at June 23, 2008 01:06 AM

Bernard Ch. -- We're past the bargaining phase.

It might well be that we're past the opportunity for a deal altogether. All things considered:
1. Israeli settlers in E. Jerusalem and on the W. Bank now number almost half a million, and given their penchant for political activism, they direct more than 10-20% of the Jewish electorate in a state where any pro-compromise government will hinge on single-digit majorities;
2. the Knesset has begun passing laws that tie the hands of any government trying to hand back land (eg. by imposing referendums etc): Israeli democracy may well present as big an obstacle to a negotiated solution as Palestinian autocracy & civil strife;
3. the Palestinian political scene has splintered irrevocably: it was not pleasant but possible to negotiate with Hamas, but it is downright impossible to negotiate with a civil war;
4. and demographics has increased the appeal of a one-state solution for Palestinians just when facts on the ground rub it into their face that they won't be getting a working two-state solution.

Add that up, and it becomes clear that, not only is the system gamed against a two-state solution -- as you neatly described it -- but the actors that parttake in and constitute the conflict have permanently changed, meaning that the entire character of the conflict has changed. Interests and capabilities are now radically different from when the two-state solution was a credible opportunity. It's all very nice that even Hamas and Likud now seem ready to accept a two-state solution, but you can't unscramble an egg, and even less two. By now the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one big politico-territorial omelette.

The settlement project had, from the very beginning, as its explicit purpose to making any serious territorial compromise impossible, and as far as I can tell, it is likely that it has by now succeeded. Of course, a one-state solution is not an option either, and neither are the fantasies about Jordan-as-Palestine etcetera. Short version, barring that miracle, everyone involved is fucked for the forseeable future: Israelis, Palestinians, Arab nations and, most certainly, the US.

Even counting Iraq, the failure to prevent this -- or rather the decision to enable it -- is likely to be the most enduring tragedy of the Bush years.

Posted by: alle at June 23, 2008 06:36 AM

While I generally agree with your statement about the US and national liberation movements, I think you're wrong when you assert that US policy wouldn't be radically different in the absence of the Israel lobby. From it's inception, American support for the Zionist "liberation" movement that carved Israel out of the relatively worthless real estate that was Arab Palestine has complicated relationships with the oil producing nations in the Middle East. In fact, support for that national liberation movement went contrary to American interests of both procuring petroleum resources and mitigating Soviet influences.

Posted by: BobS. at June 23, 2008 08:25 AM
...went contrary to American interests of both procuring petroleum resources and mitigating Soviet influences.

So what's that about? If I understood that part, I'd understand what's going on there, and yet it still eludes.

Leaving aside the Soviet influences, does unconditional support for Israeli policies correlate to US interests, and if it does, then how? If anyone did the Soviets in, it was probably driving them to the poorhouse with the help of Saudi Arabia and oil.

Because for the world, I cannot figure out what everyone assumes to be a universal given -- that US support for Israel is unquestioned and unquestionable.

Posted by: Labiche at June 23, 2008 08:50 AM

First off, what alle said.

Second, I'd agree that the power of Israel's hawkish lobby on the U.S. is staggering. I would argue that the only special interest (outside of general "wealthy aristocratic" interests) that's ever dominated our foreign policy more was the racist imperialist factions that slaveholding created. But at least slaveholding policies made immediate sense: we "had" to invade Haiti because a free republic of blacks was dangerous when you're trying to keep a rebellious popluation of blacks in check, we had to capture Flordia because it was a runaway refuge, and so on. But the beneficial economics of continuous support of Israeli hawks eludes me. I don't even see what well-off white people in the U.S. get out of that.

But does anyone think the lobby will lose influence? They pretty much have a death-grip on our body politic, even if they lose the endorsement of the U.S. public, which I think is happening. Am I being unrealistic when I say that AIPAC will be with us until we've had nothing short of revolution? I do not think that the lobby's power in the U.S. is dependent upon the political strength or political position of the hawks in Israel. Is this correct?

Posted by: No One of Consequence at June 23, 2008 10:24 AM

alle: agreed. It's likely to get ugly.

BobS: In the major changes in US-Israeli relations, you'll find the Israel lobby essentially playing no role. Two examples: '67, when Israel becomes a client state of the US and military aid
is multiplied by a factor of 4. That was purely a Cold War decision. Another was Taba'01. Do you think the Lobby was pleased by it? But we heard not a peep. Israel walked away (not the US under Lobby pressure). The US was able to ignore the Lobby.

Posted by: Bernard Chazelle at June 23, 2008 10:33 AM

Labiche and Inconsequential: Noam Chomsky says that talking about US and Israeli interests as separate items is like talking about the interests of Delaware versus those of the US. You are looking at what is basically a unit.

If US support of Israel is truly against US interests, then why not develop a specific list of ways in which this is true and deliver it to the American energy industry, which is certainly a powerful lobby. Explain to them how their interests would be better served if the US were close allies with the oil producing Muslim world, and that our engagement with Israel is actually costing them money. Appealing to their bottom line should change the whole equation, right?

No. Israel is a crucial element of US control of world energy. The key here is the word "control." It is not that we need the oil of the ME for our own use: it is just that the US wants to control the supply, and maintain the ability to shut off that supply if necessary--just like we did to Japan in 1940-41.

The energy industry understands this. It is naive to think that the US would follow a course of policy that is somehow contrary to its interests...meaning of course the interests of its owning class, the only class that ever matters when it comes to policy.

Posted by: Seth at June 23, 2008 10:54 AM

...would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state...

There is a million ways to fix Israel and there's no way to fix Israel as long as Zionists are in control.

It's not about Jews or Arabs being a majority; a rational individual won't give a flying fuck about your grandmother's religion. It's all about Zionists being a majority. Zionism has to go, and that's all there is it.

Posted by: abb1 at June 23, 2008 03:38 PM

The link didn't work.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article13495.htm

Posted by: BobS. at June 23, 2008 04:50 PM

BobS. Truman sought an alliance with Israel but Kennan and Marshall opposed it. It's Kennedy who moved closer to Israel but that was mostly a Cold War response. But '67 is when everything changed.
Until then, the main weapons supplier to Israel was not the US but France. The Six-Day war was won with French Mirages. Until then, Israel was more popular in Europe than in the US (the Kibbutz culture caught the imagination of the 60s). But the war changed all that. Europe turned against Israel. (France, in particular, never forgave Israel for starting it -- though Dassault thanked the Jewish state for the wonderful advertisement.)
And that's when the US moved in big time, quintupling its financial support by the early 70s. That was under Nixon, and you remember what Nixon thought about the Jews and the Lobby.

Posted by: Bernard Chazelle at June 23, 2008 07:54 PM

As a Zionist Jew I got nothing to add, but ask "Who's gonna move to Israel but Zionists and Palestinians?" And I'll bet some of the Palestinians wouldn't mind a vacation about now from it all. I've NEVER been to NY. I have been to Miami and Hollywood Calif. From what I see ANY Jew would be much better off in Miami, Hollywood, or New York, and happier too. I'm guessing for a Palestinian that its the same.

Posted by: Mike Meyer at June 23, 2008 10:57 PM
That was under Nixon, and you remember what Nixon thought about the Jews and the Lobby.

What do you mean? That he didn't care for them (with the taped anti-semitism), or that he resented the pressure exerted on him corresponding to the increases in support?

Posted by: Labiche at June 24, 2008 08:05 AM

I took issue with the statement that "The US has always opposed national liberation movements that got in the way of it's hegemonic aims". It hasn't "always". Post WWII, "hegemonic aims" would have included the Cold War battle for Arab hearts and minds and oil. Supporting Israel did nothing to further that cause. The article I linked to explains the pressure exerted by the nascent lobby that helped persuade Truman and the congress.

Posted by: BobS. at June 25, 2008 08:19 AM